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Abstract
The current British Governments "Big Society" plan is based on the
idea that granting more freedom to local communities and volunteers will
compensate for a withdrawal of public agencies and spending. This idea
is grounded on a widely held belief about the relationship between gov-
ernment and volunteering: a high degree of government intervention will
cause a crowding out of voluntary activity. Up to now, however, the crowd-
ing out hypothesis has hardly been supported by any empirical evidence
or solid theoretical foundations. We develop a simple theoretical model
to predict how scal policy a¤ects the individual decision to volunteer or
not. The predictions of the model are tested through the econometric
analysis of two survey data sets, and interpretative analysis of narratives
of local volunteers and public o¢ cials. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
our results suggest that volunteering, by the individuals in the actively
working population, declines when government intervention is decreased.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the British coalition government launched its plan to create a Big
Societyin which public activities and spending are rolled backand citizens
themselves take more responsibility in running public services. Ever since, com-
mentators have vilied the plan for the dominance of rhetorical power over prac-
tical feasibility. More fundamentally, the Big Society plan has reinvigorated the
debate on the relationship between government and society, or, more speci-
cally, between public spending and volunteering. It is asserted that voluntary
activity should, can, and will emerge as a perfect substitute for the welfare state.
This hypothesis is based on the widely held belief that government expenditure
has a crowding out e¤ect on volunteering: an increase (decrease) in public ex-
penditure brings about a signicant decrease (increase) in agentspropensity to
volunteer. Surprisingly enough, this belief is not backed up by solid theoretical
foundations or empirical evidence. As the same goes for the opposite, crowding
in e¤ect, the goal of this paper is to establish how a change in public spending
a¤ects the decision of citizens to volunteer.
This paper provides a theoretical model and empirical evidence to sup-
port the existence of a crowding in e¤ect of government expenditure on volun-
teering. We focus our analysis on the working part of the population, because
this is probably the most pivotal group of citizens when trying to stimulate vol-
unteering. Employed agents have to make a decision between allocating their
time to working in the private market or to voluntary work, and are therefore
not indi¤erent about whether the public good is produced through government
or volunteering. Rather, their decision to volunteer is dependent on the level of
government expenditure. Employed agents are more likely to volunteer when
public spending is higher.
This conclusion is reached through econometric analysis of two survey
datasets (European Values Survey and British Household Panel Survey) and
narrative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with local volunteers and
public professionals (between October and December 2009 in Glasgow). Our
ndings suggest that the decision of employed agents to volunteer depends not
only on government expenditure, but also on their personal abilities and existing
volunteering capital. Lower public spending increases the probability of setbacks
and frustrations for volunteers and decreases the availability of adequate support
structures and professional skills. This lead us to conclude that less public
spending reduces the likelihood of (successful) volunteering, but also that more
public spending will not necessarily lead to a crowding in of voluntary activity.
Rather, based on our model and ndings we recommend that exploration of
government as a facilitator or enabler or volunteering capital might be the best
direction for developing the literature on volunteering as well as the Big Society
plan.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 motivates the analysis and dis-
cusses the existing related literature. Section 3 presents and analyses the the-
oretical model. Section 4 carries out the econometric analysis of the testable
predictions of our model. Section 5 discusses interviews we have undertaken on
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this issue. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Big Society: Reinvigorating the Crowd-
ing Out Debate
During the 2010 British elections, the nancial crisis, and its impact on public
expenditure, drove the welfare state to the top of the political agenda. The de-
bate did not evolve around economic policy and the necessity of severe cutbacks
per se, but more fundamentally reected diverging ideologies about the rela-
tionship between state and society for delivering public services (Smith, 2010).
While Labour sought to continue increasing public spending and taxation, the
Conservatives proposed a radical turn to a small government and a big society.
The latter vision came out on top, when the Conservatives formed a coalition
government with the Liberal-Democrats and put their plan for the Big Society
in place. The main idea of the Big Society is that rolling back big government
will create a climate in which communitiestake up the responsibility to run
public services (Cabinet O¢ ce, 2010). By withdrawing public spending and
agencies, it is claimed, local citizens will feel more motivated to volunteer for
improving their communities.
Since the launch of the Big Society in May 2010, it has received a fair
amount of scepticism and resentment. The Big Society was proposed to bring
about a new era of people power through policy measures such as provid-
ing volunteering training to local citizens, and especially young people, giving
nancial support to mutuals, co-operatives, charities and social enterprises to
take over and run public services, and giving a general power of competence to
local councils (Cabinet O¢ ce, 2010). However, initial concerns about whether
it would actually provide anything new and useful were conrmed when Liver-
pool Council withdrew as one of the four pilot projects (BBC, 2011a). Criticism
grew that the coalition government was only meeting its a¤ectionate rhetoric
with lukewarm initiatives and little concrete promises (Alcock, 2010). Further-
more, the Big Society has been condemned for being a symbolic device used
to legitimize excessive cuts on public services and voluntary sector funding and
consequently destroying the basic texture of voluntary programmes and activi-
ties (BBC, 2011b).
The crucial issue at stake here is whether less public spending will indeed
lead more people into volunteering. It is openly questioned whether voluntary
work would automatically emerge as a perfect substitute for government ac-
tivity. In order for the Big Society to be successful, there should be a strong
crowding out e¤ect to counter the cuts in public spending: an increase (de-
crease) in public expenditure brings about a signicant decrease (increase) in
agentspropensity to volunteer. While academic and policy debates are divided
between the conventional beliefs that the relationship between government ex-
penditure and volunteering is either a matter of crowding out or crowding in,
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there is surprisingly little theoretical and empirical support for either position.
Therefore, our focus in this paper is to nd out if a change in public spending
a¤ects agentslevel of volunteering, and, if so, in which direction.
2.1 Volunteering by Employed Individuals
In the literature there have been several important developments for analyzing
the connection between government expenditure and voluntary work at a macro-
economic level. Over the past years several empirical works have studied the
determinants of voluntary work for the total population or for specic groups
of people. For example, at a general level people can decide to start volunteer-
ing, or give money to charity, because of pure altruism or warm-glow altruism
(Andreoni 1990), because they want personally to make a di¤erence(Duncan,
2004), because they are the most impatient to receive a certain good (Bilodeau
and Slivinski, 1996), because giving can enhance their wellbeing (Meier and
Stutzer, 2008), because of social pressure (Della Vigna et al., 2009), or be-
cause they are obliged by social norms (Olken and Singhal, 2009). The decision
to participate in voluntary activities is also likely to be inuenced by the so-
cioeconomic or ethnic composition of the agentsneighbourhood or community
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Atkinson & Kintrea, 2001; Goodlad and Meegan,
2005).
Although the Big Society in particular aims at enhancing volunteer-
ing in (deprived) neighbourhoods or communities, several authors have sug-
gested that the decision of citizens to volunteer might depend more strongly on
macro-economical factors rather than the characteristics of the area of residence
(Hastings, 2003; Amin, 2005; Atkinson, Buck, & Kintrea, 2005; New Economics
Foundation, 2010). An important stream of research has explored how a change
in the size of the welfare state inuences the decision to volunteer (e.g. Khanna
& Sandler, 2000; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005; Hackl et al., 2010). These studies
have focused on the entire population or on the specic age groups of young
people and retired people. However, perhaps the most crucial type of citizen,
both for the Big Society as for the relationship between government expendi-
ture and volunteering in general, is part of the population that has to allocate
time between working in the market, volunteering and leisure. In this paper,
therefore, we explore the impact of public spending on volunteering, but, for
the rst time to our knowledge, only concentrate on the employed part of the
population.
At an aggregate population level, recent studies have investigated the pos-
sibility of crowding in or crowding out e¤ects due to an increase of the welfare
state. In particular Khanna and Sandler (2000) nd an opposite e¤ect (crowding
in) in a study regarding money donations in the UK. Van Oorschot and Arts
(2005) do not nd evidence to support the hypothesis of crowding out when
considering data from the third wave of the World Values Survey, and using the
total government expenditure as measure of the welfare state. On the other side,
4
Hackl et al. (2010), when concentrating on the independent variable of social
government spending in their analysis of data of OECD countries, taken from
the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey, do nd a crowding
out e¤ect on the four world waves (1981, 1990, 1995, 1999).
Age tends to be a very strong determinant of the decision to volunteer. First
of all, rm evidence exists that agents tend to start volunteering later in life,
mainly after their retirement (Mutchler et al., 2003). In fact, retired people are
often so overrepresented in voluntary activities that old age is one of the key
characteristics of the usual suspects(e.g. Barnes et al., 2007). To be sure, the
reasons for volunteering at an old age are likely to be varied and depend strongly
on the health condition of the agent (Erlighagen and Hank, 2006). At the same
time, in the past years the voluntary work of young citizens has been studied
in research about the connection between volunteering and human capital. For
example, the study by Day and Devlin (1998) nds a positive connection be-
tween the returning rate of income after having done voluntary work in Canada.
Young citizens, about to enter the job market, can see volunteering as an op-
timal decision for enhancing their human capital and thereby having prospects
of a higher income.
The innovation of our approach is to concentrate on the e¤ect that the size of
the government expenditure has on the active working population only. Below,
we build a model in which active agents have to decide how to allocate their time
between working and volunteering. Contrary to the work by Duncan (1999) and
Freeman (1997) we concentrate on time donation only, because we conceptualize
volunteering as a social activity in which citizens are actually engaged in the
delivery of public services. For example, the ambition of the Big Society is to
give citizens, communities and local government the power and information
they need to come together, solve the problems they face and build the Britain
they want(Cabinet O¢ ce, 2010, p. 1).
Time donation by employed agents is not a matter of a complete crowd-
ing out e¤ect. In theoretical models about money or time donation with pure
altruism, the crowding out e¤ect emerges directly because volunteering is a
substitute for government expenditure. What counts for agents is that a pub-
lic good exists and they are indi¤erent about whether it is produced through
government activity or their own voluntary work. In an impure altruism frame-
work, agents receive utility from volunteering and are therefore not indi¤erent
about the source of the public good. In this case, the crowding out e¤ect can no
longer be complete (Andreoni 2006). In our model, we consider how government
expenditure and taxation inuences the decision of employed agents about their
time allocation. Agents receive utility from the total amount of volunteering
in the society as a form of public good as well as the result of their personal
volunteering (rather than solely the hours spent volunteering per se).
Whether an employed agent will be willing and able to donate time to vol-
unteering will also depend on their abilities. Citizens with more skills and
experience are more prone to volunteering as well as to being more e¤ective in
it. One of the main problems of voluntary work is getting other people than
just the usual suspects to participate (Barnes et al., 2007; Skidmore et al.,
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2006; Taylor et al., 2011). Lacking the rightabilities to volunteer in the right
place at the righttime can provide an entry barrier to citizens who work and
therefore only have a limited amount of time available.
This e¤ect can be mediated by the size of volunteering capital; i.e. the
volunteering that is inherited from previous generations. We assume that the
voluntary activities of previous generations do not die away but that at least
some parts of it remain intact. For example, volunteering capital can take
the form of a school built, an organization founded, handbooks with practi-
cal knowledge and know-how, or continuing volunteering programs. We note
that volunteering capital is di¤erent from social capital: whereas social capi-
tal refers to the presence of social relationships that o¤er access to particular
goods (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Edwards and Foley, 1998), volunteering
does not necessarily require the presence of any social relationships to engage
in the production of the public good. For example, if the residents of a social
housing scheme are expected to keep the hallway of their building clean, they
might decide to spend a certain amount of time each week on cleaning without
having any social relationships with their neighbours that a¤ects this decision
1 .
In conclusion, while the literature has identied many factors to a¤ect the
willingness of citizens to volunteer, the inuence of government expenditure on
employed agents has been insu¢ ciently explored. However, this relationship
is fundamental to the widely held belief in the crowding out e¤ect. Therefore,
below we build a model that conceptualizes this link and takes into consideration
the mediating e¤ects of abilities and voluntary capital.
3 The Economy
We assume successive generations t of agents, with each agent is indexed by
i 2 [0; 1], and the total mass of individuals is normalized to 1. Population
does not change over time and there is only one active individual per family.
Agents live for one period and they are characterized by a certain degree of
inner abilities Ait > 0 and capital inherited from the parent kipt 1 > 0. Each
individual allocates her working hours Hit between voluntary work hivt and
market work hipt.
The utility function depends on private end-of-life consumption cit and be-
quest kipt volunteering Vit; public good Gt and disutility of work Hit:
uit =
"
citk
1 
ipt
 (1  )1 
#e
+ V eit + G
e
t  
 H2it
2
(1)
1Clearly social capital and volunteering capital can be mutually reinforcing. However, for
the purposes of this model it is crucial to distinguish between both concepts rather than
following this often prematurely made assumption.
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where parameters satisfy 0 <  < 1, 0 < e < 1 , 0 <  < 1, and 0 <
 < 1:Hence in this model we have both intragenerational altruism, expressed
through volunteering, and intergenerational altruism, espressed through leaving
bequest.
The labour supplied in the market, the private capital, and the productive
abilities serve to produce the aggregate good in the economy:
Xit = Aith

ipt 1k
1 
ipt
where 0 <  < 1: The after-tax end of life wealth is given by:
Wit = (1   t)Xit = (1   t)Aithiptk1 ipt 1
At the end of their life agents allocate their after-tax-wealth between con-
sumption and bequest maximizing subutility
citk
1 
ipt
(1 )1  , which implies:
cit = (1  )Wit kipt = Wit.
Since cit + kipt =Wit, the indirect utility function can be rewritten as
uit =W
e
it + V
e
it + G
e
t  
 H2it
2
(2)
Analyzing employed agents only, we rule out the possibility that the mo-
tivation for volunteering is to invest in human capital in order to nd a job (
Day and Devlin, 1998). We assume that volunteering is motivated by warm
glow altruism. Each persons volunteering impact depends on the hours spent
volunteering, her productive abilities2 , and the aggregate volunteering capital
kvt 1:
Vit = Aith

ivtk
1 
vt 1 (3)
The volunteering capital evolves according to:
kvt = (1  )kvt 1 +
Z
hvjtAjtdj + 
 represents the natural decay rate of the volunteering capital lost across
generations. A certain degree of volunteering capital  is independent from
2 In this section we assume that private sector abilities and volunteering abilities are per-
fectly correlated. In section 3.2, when considering non-active individuals, we will drop this
assumption.
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the volunteering as it is guaranteed from the market interactions. In fact, we
think it realistic to assume that even if initial volunteering capital were zero,
the market would still harbour a minimum possibility for voluntary activity to
emerge. That is, even in the extreme case in which any history of volunteering
or social relationships was absent, agents could make volunteering arise from
the very basic social contact that is involved even in market activities.
The public good can be provided either using government revenues or vol-
unteering:
Gt =  t
Z
Ajth

jptk
1 
jpt 1dj + k
1 
vt 1
Z
Ajth

jvtdj
Assuming that the abilities are stationary, in steady state each agents capital
would converge to:
kip = [(1  )Ai]
1
 hip.
3.1 Optimal time allocation
We want to study the optimal allocation of time between working and volun-
teering. The rst order conditions are:
@uit
@hip
= eW e 1p (1  )Aitk1 ipt 1h 1ipt    (hivt + hipt) (4)
= e

(1   t)Aitk1 ipt 1
e
he 1ipt    (hivt + hipt)
= 0 (5)
and
@uit
@hivt
= eV e 1it Aitk
1 
vt 1h
 1
ipt    (hivt + hipt) (6)
= e

Aitk
1 
vt 1
e
he 1ivt    (hivt + hipt)
= 0 (7)
from which we obtain:
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
hipt
hivt
e 1
=
 
k

vt 1
(1  )k1 ipt 1
!e
and therefore
hipt =
 
(1  )k1 ipt 1
k

vt 1
! "
1 e
hivt (8)
Substituting (8) in (6) we can write:
e

Aitk
1 
vt 1
e
he 1ivt    
24hivt + (1  )k1 ipt 1
k

vt 1
! "
1 e
hivt
35 = 0
he 2ivt  
 
e

Aitk
1 
vt 1
e
241 + (1  )k1 ipt 1
k

vt 1
! "
1 e
35 = 0
The optimal amount of voluntary work:
hivt =

e
 
 1
2 e
0BBB@

Aitk
1 
vt 1
 e
1 e

(1  )Aitk1 ipt
 e
1 e
+ (Aitkvt 1)
e
1 e
 1
2 e
1CCCA (9)
=

e
 
 1
2 e
A
e
2 e
it
0BBB@ k
(1 )e
1 e
vt 1
(1  )k1 ipt
 e
1 e
+ kvt 1
(1 )e
1 e
 1
2 e
1CCCA(10)
Substituting (9) in (8) we obtain the optimal market working hours:
hipt =

e
 
 1
2 e
0BBB@

(1  )Aitk1 ipt
 e
1 e

(1  )Aitk1 ipt
 e
1 e
+ (Aitkvt 1)
e
1 e
 1
2 e
1CCCA
=

e
 
 1
2 e
A
e
2 e
it
0BBB@

(1  )k1 ipt
 e
1 e

(1  )k1 ipt
 e
1 e
+ kvt 1
(1 )e
1 e
 1
2 e
1CCCA
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Higher inner ability Ajt makes agent j more willing to both work in the
market and volunteer. A change in the abilities change each agents optimal
time allocation in the same proportion no matter the personal ratio of private
capital to volunteering capital.
However a shock on the economy that cuts both the privately owned capital
and the volunteering capital in the same proportion will not be neutral. Imagine
a shock that a¤ect all the capital in a society, such as a stock market shock.
The smaller the ratio of private capital to volunteering capital for an agent the
more a crisis that cuts of capital in the society will a¤ect her volunteering. In
other words, the poorer is an agent the more her volunteering is going to be
a¤ected by an economic crisis.
Also the taxation inuences the decisions of timing allocation between vol-
unteering and working in the market. In particular:
Proposition 1 An increase (decrease) in  t brings about an increase (decrease)
in the optimal volunteering hours hivt and a decrease (increase) in the optimal
working hours for each agent i 2 [0; 1].
Proof. Taking the rst derivative of hivt with respect to the taxation we obtain:
@hivt
@ t
=

e
 
 1
2 e
A
e
2 e
it
e

Aitk
1 
vt 1
 e
1 e

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e 1+e
1 e
k1 ipt 1
(2  e)(1  e)

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
+ kvt 1
(1 )e
1 e
 3 e
2 e
 0
The rst derivative of hipt with respect to  t is:
@hipt
@ t
=

e
 
 1
2 e
A
e
2 e
it
e
1  e
0BB@

(1  )k1 ipt
 e 1+e
1 e
k1 ipt 
kvt 1
e
1 e + (1   t) e1 e
 1
2 e
1CCA
0BB@

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
(2  e)

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
+ kvt 1
(1 )e
1 e
   1
1CCA
Which is negative since:
0 

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
(2  e)

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
+ kvt 1
(1 )e
1 e
  1 (11)
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Proposition 1 states that a contraction of the welfare state does not cause
an increase in the voluntary labour supply, but on the contrary it provokes a
decrease in it, at the same time an increase in the amount of hours worked in
the market. A decrease in the tax rate  reduces the disincentive on private
work and therefore agents decide to spend more hours working in the market
and less hours volunteering. An increase in the tax rate works in the opposite
way.
However, Proposition 1 does not directly imply that an increase in taxation
brings about an increase in the public good tout court. The disincentive e¤ect
of taxation on private labour supply could be so strong that could cause the
government revenues to decrease. In this way the increase in public good caused
by the increase in the volunteering could be compensated and even o¤set by
the decrease in the worked hours. Proposition 2 provides the conditions that
guarantees that an increase in taxation generates an increase in the public good
provision.
Proposition 2 If t1 t 
1 e
e an increase in the taxation causes a net decrease
(increase) in the public good provision in both the government component and
the voluntary one.
Proof. It is necessary to prove that if conditions in the Proposition 2 holds,
than the public good Gt increases in both factors  t
Z
Ajth

jptk
1 
jpt 1dj and
k
1 
vt 1
R
Ajth

jvtdj as  t increases. From Proposition 1 we know that an in-
crease in  t will cause an increase in hivt. We need to nd the condition under
which an increase in  t brings an increase in the optimal amount of government
revenues. The elasticity of the optimal work supply to the taxation is:
hp; =
 t
(1   t)
e
(1  e)
0BB@

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
(2  e)

(1  )k1 ipt 1
 e
1 e
+ kvt 1
(1 )e
1 e
   1
1CCA
Proposition 1, if t1 t <
1 e
e the elasticity is 0 < hp; < 1. Therefore, as
long as t1 t <
1 e
e the work supply is inelastic. An increase (decrease) in  t
translate in a net increase of the public good supply also in the government part
of the public good. QED.
In Figure 1 we illustrate a representative numerical example, showing how
the equilibrium amount of average working hours, volunteering, public good
production, and utility respond to changes in the tax rate:
11
Figure 1
It is worthwhile remarking that this kind of diagram is extremely robust
over a wide range of possible parameter values, and it has been provided here
just to give the reader a visual illustration of the results we have already proved
analytically.
3.2 Non-active Agents
So far, we have analysed the response to taxation of employed agents only.
What would the response of agents who do not work be? Let us generalise
this framework by assuming that there are two di¤erent types of abilities in the
model: AitP for the production of the good Xit and AitV for the provision the
volunteering.
Non-productive agent j can be viewed as characterised by a negative shock
on the productive abilities, so that Ajpt = 0, while AjtV > 0: Her indirect
utility function then becomes:
12
ujt = V
e
jt + G
e
t  
 H2jt
2
(12)
The optimal private work is hjpt = 0. The FOC relative to the hours spent
volunteering are:
@uit
@hivt
= eV e 1it Aitk
1 
vt 1h
 1
ipt    hivt (13)
= e

Aitk
1 
vt 1
e
he 2ivt    
= 0 (14)
In this case the optimal amount of hours spent volunteering does not depend
on tax rates:
hivt =

e
 

Aitk
1 
vt 1
e 12 e
Therefore, assuming that there is a strong proportion of non-employed agents
that volunteer, our model is consistent with the empirical results by Van Oorschot
and Arts (2005), who do not nd evidence on the hypothesis of crowding out or
crowding in.
4 Government Expenditure, Abilities, and Vol-
unteering: Econometric Analysis
We used two di¤erent datasets to test the relationship between government ex-
penditure, abilities and volunteering for employed individuals. The rst dataset
contains the intersection of the OECD countries and the countries included in
the European Values Survey fourth wave (2008), for a total of 24,082 observation
from 16 countries. The second dataset is the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), which contains survey data about the UK from 1991 to 2007, for a
total of 140,850 observations. In these datasets, we have analyzed the e¤ect
of the General Government Expenditure and personal education on the binary
variable of doing unpaid work for any association concerned with, among oth-
ers, environment, professional activities, youth work, sports/recreation, women
activities, peace, health. In both datasets we have found a signicant positive
relationship between employed agentsdecision to volunteer and both the total
government expenditure and agentsabilities.
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In order to study how the size of the welfare state inuences the level
of volunteering, we needed to analyze how expansions or contractions of the
Governments Expenditure3 cause changes in the probability for each individual
to volunteer.
In the rst dataset, we have reparametrized the answer about the volun-
teering, so that 0 means that the respondent does not do any voluntary work and
1 means that the respondent does voluntary work. The General Government
Expenditure is taken from the OECD dataset and for each country is calculated
as the ratio between General Government Expenditure and GDP in 2008. Edu-
cation is measured by the number of years of education, which we have used as a
proxy for abilities. For each country, we consider only the decisions by employed
agents. Since we are dealing with a binary dependent variable we report the re-
sults of our Logit estimations, but using Probit would not change our qualitative
results. The connection between the government expenditure and volunteering
among workers seems really robust, whether education is introduced or not.
TABLE I: Europe
The results of the model about the dependence of the volunteering on the
size of the welfare state and personal abilities are conrmed by the data about
Europe. From TABLE 1 we can see that General Government Expenditure and
Education are both strongly signicant. The coe¢ cient of Government Expen-
diture is positive and bigger than one (1.513626), which supports the crowding
in hypothesis. The coe¢ cient of the education is positive (.230795), which con-
rms that an increase in the abilities increases the probability of volunteering.
For the second dataset, the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to
2007, we have repeated this analysis, with the di¤erence that this time personal
income was used as a substitute for abilities. The dependent variable is also
slightly di¤erent from the one of the European Values Survey, as it responds
3Hackl et al. (2009) argue that in order to analyze crowding in or crowing out it is
necessary to consider the Social Expenditure instead of the General Government Expenditure.
To test the model, we nevertheless decided to focus on the latter, because Social Expenditure
data does not cover the phenomenon of volunteering in its entirety. Volunteering data also
includes the decisions to participate in activities that are not (directly) related to Social
Expenditure. Data on Social Expenditure only take into account benets such as pensions,
disability pensions, family allowances etc., and do not cover services to citizens (for example
education, environment, or minority group rights).
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to the question about the respondent being active in one or more organizations
such as political party, trade union, environmental group, parents association,
tenant association, religious group, voluntary group, community group, sport
club, in women institute, in women group or in other group. Also in this case
we have excludes the non-employed agents, obtaining the following results:
TABLE II: UK A
While it could have been the case that British citizens react in a di¤erent
way from individuals living in Continental Europe, also from the BHPS dataset
we found strong evidence to conrm that the probability of volunteering, for
employed individuals, is positively related to Government Expenditure and abil-
ities. In the UK case the Government Expenditure is signicant, positive, and
bigger than 1, showing a coe¢ cient remarkably similar to that obtained from
the analysis of the European dataset (1.642890). Also income, used as a proxy
for abilities, is positive and signicant. The fact that the coe¢ cient is small de-
pends on the magnitude of the income related to the dummy variable of doing
voluntary work or not.
The BHPS also provides data to test the time allocation assumption, i.e.
that an increase in the hours worked in the market implies a decrease of the
hours spent volunteering. Therefore, in TABLE III we insert the data about
the amount of hours worked per week in the regression.
TABLE III: UK B
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It appears that agents indeed have to allocate their time between volun-
teering and working in the market. TABLE III shows that the variable Hours
Worked Per Week is signicant and negative, and that, at least for the UK, the
main assumption about time allocation is supported by the data.
In sum, we have proved that the data are consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical model about the dependence of volunteering on the size of
the welfare state and personal abilities. These ndings support the view that
government expenditure causes a crowding in e¤ect on volunteering: a decrease
in public spending decreases the probability that employed agents decide to
volunteer.
5 Volunteering Capital and Personal Motivations:
Narrative Analysis
While our econometric ndings indicate that abilities also inuence this vol-
unteering decision, in our datasets there were no data available to support the
inuence of our theoretical notion of volunteering capital, nor to understand the
relationship between these variables. However, the analysis of this section may
help to cast more lights on these qualitative relationships, by explicating how in
practice the presence of volunteering capital can a¤ect the decision of employed
agents to volunteer.
The narrative data consists of 19 interviews conducted between October
and December 2009 in Glasgow (UK) part of a comparative project on commu-
nity participation in deprived neighbourhoods in several European countries.
The interviews were conducted with 7 active residents of the area Pollokshields
Southside Central, 7 public professionals working for various agencies delivering
public services in this area, and 5 public professionals working in support of
Glasgow City Council in this and several other areas of the city. The respon-
dents were asked about their practices, everyday ideas, choices and actions, with
regards to community participation, which were transcribed and systematically
analyzed by means of a set of rigorous methods and techniques to inductively
develop an analytical understanding of what is going on in the empirical data
(Charmaz, 2006).
The goal was to establish what these people were actually trying to com-
municate when they said or did something, and what communicative barriers
prevented them from constructive collaboration. For this purpose, the inter-
views were approached as narratives: a range of storiesa person tells about
real or imagined situations that wittingly or unwittingly enables this person to
pinpoint what happened, make sense of these happenings, and express his/her
evaluation of them. By reconstructing and confronting the narratives of di¤erent
people, it becomes possible to see the assumptions, beliefs, and emotions that
underlie their daily experiences and identify broader behavioral patterns and
tensions. While the overall research was much broader than voluntary activity
alone, the narratives analysis revealed two dominant narratives with regards to
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citizens motivations to participate and the importance of voluntary capital.
The rst narrative is work in progress, which signies that volunteering
is an ongoing, complex, and demanding process. The following quote of a public
professional working in support of the Council is illustrative:
.
".. part of the process is ... taking the message ... to ... community councils,
... area committees, youve got tenants and residents associations, youth groups,
you know .... Basically if you identify where they are, and who they are, then
making contact with them, going along and making a presentation.... And you
might go to ten of those, you know, and for every ten you might get one ... who
is willing to come along, and they might just come along to a meeting, decide
its not for them and then disappear again. But thats again what I say about
the nature of it and its about continuing to go out and spread the word and
networking with partners to make sure that ... theyre spreading the word ....
So, but its just an ongoing piece of work ... that doesnt stop .... So very much
work in progress..." (Respondent 3)
The respondent indicates that the daily support for voluntary work is very
time, energy, and resource intensive, because there is no stopping rule to recruit-
ing volunteers. It is about continuing to go out to meet new people, making
contact, convincing them to come along, providing them with adequate train-
ing, and keeping them on board. In order to secure a continuity of services with
such a high turnover of volunteers, there is a strong need for su¢ cient support
structures and professional skills (see also Taylor et al., 2011, p. 9; Skidmore et
al., 2006). Notice that the respondent only talks here about going out to people
who are already part of a group that does voluntary work. The experience is
that for new citizens to volunteer the process is even much more a work in
progress.
The second narrative is making a di¤erence, which denotes that citi-
zens start to volunteer because they are committed to solving particular prob-
lems, but struggle with a lot of setbacks preventing actually making a di¤erence
to their community.
". . . when I got involved with the Community Council . . . a particular person
would lead on a particular project and the rest would fall in line and support
that. . . . It worked really well and it was mutually benecial . . . , and then
you see the e¤ects in peoples day-to-day lives. . . . I dont look for feedback
through, you know, strategic bodies who are going to make an assessment of
something has been a success or not, I get my feedback through my neighbours
in my community and when I see things happening. . . . I mean, . . . I had a
big community event in the summer. . . , and I had been asked at this event if
I would do a survey for the Community Council. . . . I said Of course, thats
ne, Ill do it, even though I really didnt have time . . . . I emailed every single
member in my Community Council . . . and I said Were having this big event,
it would be really lovely if you would . . . come along and help me . . . and have
fun. Not one . . . Community Councillor came. . . . Thats when I knew that . . .
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it wasnt really functioning." (Respondent 7)
The respondent explains that her main motivation for volunteering is seeing
problems being solved in her direct living environment. However, there are
often a lot of setbacks that cause deep frustration. Starting to volunteer, and
keeping on doing so, therefore requires a very strong commitment and well-
developed skills. This implies that citizens with higher abilities will be more
likely to volunteer, as having less skills and experience can either prevent a
person from deciding to start volunteering or to give up more quickly. The
decision to volunteer is therefore mediated by a persons abilities to make a
di¤erence.
Taken together, these narratives clarify why the decision of an employed
agent to volunteer depends on their abilities and voluntary capital: she is less
likely to allocate time to volunteering when she lacks the abilities to get involved
in voluntary work and e¤ectively participate in it, and there is insu¢ cient vol-
untary capital to counter the inevitable setbacks and frustrations. At a deeper
level, these ndings suggest that government expenditure is a crucial variable
for volunteering: less public spending increases the probability of setbacks and
frustration and decreases the availability of adequate support structures and
professional skills. Thus, this narrative analysis has further conrmed the model
and the results of the econometric analysis, as well as provided some deeper in-
sight into the relationships between government expenditure, abilities, voluntary
capital, and volunteering.
6 Final Remarks
We have found that, in contrast to common beliefs, government expenditure
actually has a crowding in e¤ect on the volunteering of employed agents: less
public spending reduces the likelihood of (successful) volunteering. This nding
should not be interpreted as (political) argument in favour of Big Government
and against Big Society. The point is not that increasing public spending will
automatically lead more citizens to volunteer. In fact, after a certain tipping
point(see gure 1) further increasing the government expenditure will lead the
overall public good to decrease. Therefore, based on our model and ndings we
want to suggest that government expenditure has to be su¢ cient to maintain
volunteering capital and facilitate volunteering.
From this perspective, the government fulls a di¤erent role in society
than merely providing public agencies and spending to directly or indirectly
deliver services. Rather, the government acts as facilitator, or enabler, that does
not decide for, but with volunteers what the level of public spending should be
and how this could maintain and improve volunteering capital. It is not simply
a matter of a government that is present or withdraws; it requires a government
that places itself next to voluntary workers and organizations to collaboratively
make volunteering work. This would be a government that is not steering but
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serving (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; King & Stivers, 1998). In e¤ect, this
requires, for example for the Big Society plan, that the government should not
be rolling back, nor simply rolling in, but rather rolling out the red carpet.
Many factors were already known to a¤ect levels of voluntary activity, but
to our surprise the relationship between public spending and volunteering had
great lacunae, which were lled by the widely held belief in the existence of a
crowding out e¤ect. With this paper we have sought to assess the validity of
this popular assumption by developing a theoretical model about the inuence of
government expenditure on the decision of employed agents to allocate their time
to voluntary work or not. Our model and ndings provide strong foundations for
the thesis that government expenditure leads to a crowding in e¤ect of voluntary
activity. In the realistic data for the UK and for Europe, higher public spending
increases the probability that the working part of the population will decide to
volunteer. What we can safely learn from our analysis is not that the government
expenditure should be increased, but rather than stepping back, the government
should position itself as a facilitator, or enabler, of volunteering capital.
Admitted, this is a somewhat speculative conclusion for which our model and
ndings do not provide any concrete indications of how to put it into practice.
We provide only a preliminary analysis of the relationship between government
expenditure and volunteering and a prospective view on the e¤ects we might
expect from the Big Society plan. While it might be objected that no valid
conclusions can be drawn about the e¤ects of the Big Society plan without an-
alyzing data following its launch in time, we concur that our test of the main
belief underlying this policy provides valuable insights into the likelihood of its
success or failure as well as helpful recommendations about the direction in
which it could be amended. Our ndings lead us to believe that more specic
recommendations could be formulated by further research in the ways govern-
ment expenditure interacts with the personal abilities of agents and inuences
the volunteering capital. A main limitation of our model is that it does not allow
for such interactions. However, in its current form it does rmly establish that
government expenditure has a crowding in e¤ect on the decision to volunteer
by employed agents.
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